TOP SECRET

this period to protect the President was also -- I guess there
was some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisis --

Mr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been a
mistake, because it put Khrushchev in a position where he
felt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President,
and so forth, which we felt would not have been the case
otherwise.

So this didn't change Mr. Dulles' at all, it made him even
stronger in wanting to protect the President, because he knew
the President was difficult to protect.

Mr. Dawson. During the period following the U-2 crisis
you saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligence
operations?

Mr. Dillon. He did this at every National Security
Council meeting. The format of the meetings were that the
meeting would be called to order by the President, and then
he would turn to Mr. Dulles for the intelligence briefing,
which was the first item of business in all those meetings.

Mr. Dawson. On those occasions did Mr. Dulles attempt to
tell the President enough where he would have some idea of
what was going on, but not tell him directly what was
happening?

Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligence,
what other people were doing and what was happening. And it

TOP SECRET

NW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 112