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bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."

He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded
assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action
with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's
Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean
Situation, 12 September 1970)

The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's
assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the
CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military ac-
tion is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize
power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memo-
randum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14,
September 14, Viron P. Vaky)

On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports and
what action was to be taken:

Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared
review of political and military options in the
Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy
and Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Com-
mittee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg"
gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the
Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to
leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second
election for the presidency.

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