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bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."

He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded

assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action

with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's

Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean

Situation, 12 September 1970)

The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's

assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the

CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military ac-

tion is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize

power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memo-

randum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14,

September 14, Viron P. Vaky)

On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports and

what action was to be taken:

Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared

review of political and military options in the

Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy

and Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Com-

mittee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg"

gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the

Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to

leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second

election for the presidency.

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