ARNOLD Meeting in San Juan, P.R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: Cooling Over Unsold Eggs

1. ARNOLD-19 confided to us that ARNOLD-1 had, prior to the launching of Operation ZORRO, prepared a "three and one half page" news release which laid exaggerated claim to damage inflicted during the raid on Santa Cruz del Sur. Only the last sentence stated, more or less as an afterthought, that this should be considered just a minor RF operation. ARNOLD-19 told ARNOLD-1 that in his opinion any future announcements should be held down to one or two brief paragraphs.

2. We pointed out to ARNOLD-19 that ARNOLD-1 was evidently paying no more than lip service to our recommendation that he under-rather than over-play his successes. During the Washington meeting (19-21 March 1964) we had criticized a statement made by ARNOLD-1 during a Miami press conference to wit: "We do not have enough boats. In one night we can sink the Cuban navy but not more, but we are doing this. We will fill the country with enough arms to free the island from communism." We took the position that if it were an ARNOLD-1's shoes--simply wouldn't let on about military operations such as this one in Castro's hands, giving him ammunition to argue he has to continue measures of the type followed by saying anything and without talking about successful ops inside.

3. We mentioned to ARNOLD-1 that any vital information not published makes the task of Castro's intelligence service that much more difficult. Besides, things had not come to such a pass that little credence was placed in ARNOLD-1's statements and promises held out by Cuban exile leaders. What really counted was the demonstrable existence of success and the support given for it. We stressed that it was essential that by preserving a pattern of credibility. We counseled ARNOLD-1 to resist a natural tendency to.