



Title: **157-10014-10151\_p475.png**

Provenance:

Category: **Uncategorized**

Person:

Date:

but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed and the Task Force concluded

set the plan [of October 19] into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub-machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus \$50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand).

(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22)

Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)

...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valenzuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the Presidential election and the Valenzuela group maintained some hope they could still carry out their plans.

### E. The Killing of General Schneider

(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)

In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt. Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.\*

\*Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:

...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to