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Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end. On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

### III. CIA Implementation of Track II

#### A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective. (Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.

The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger) Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him.

There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind of coup...but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning. (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

#### 1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with