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Provenance:

Category: **Uncategorized**

Person:

Date:

Similarly, Kissinger did not remember having been informed that the CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He stated:

"My perception at that period was that if they had a coup they would come...back to us before triggering it...at no time during the period did they, in fact, tell us...that they had a coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed, they generally told us the opposite."

(Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26)

As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meeting on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes of that meeting, CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed.

However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:

"Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende position such as proposed in NSSM 97... It was agreed that an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr. Kissinger said this

presumed total acceptance of a fait accompli and higher authority had no intention of conceding before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone left unturned." (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970, 7 October 1970)

October 8

Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar)

In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch with two different groups of military plotters. He believed there must have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going contacts.

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