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Provenance:

Category: **Uncategorized**

Person:

Date:

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

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Hedgeman stressed that in this period, 1960-1961, the Congo was fraught with utter confusion; he says that what they were running was a Scotch tape and baling-wire operation. As for paramilitary operations, Hedgeman said they began seriously in the end of 1962 with the arrival of a number of T-6's that he and Ed Gullion had asked for. He said that these aircraft were not intended to be used in combat, but only to reassure the Congolese that the United States was with them and provide them with a bit of black magic. Hedgeman professed that the paramilitary combat missions of 1963, in support of anti-rebel activities, were really quite minor affairs.

Some specifics. Hedgeman contended that he had no knowledge of the approval of funding of South African mercenaries and tribal leaders capable of resistance as approved by the 303 Committee. He also said, though, that he had important contact with Mike Hoare mercenaries, they gave no direct or indirect support to them. He also said there was no, repeat no, complicity or support on the part of the CIA in the ouster of Kasavubu by Mobutu in November of 1965.

Throughout the conversation, Hedgeman inter-

persed the most hair-raising tales of his and his daughter's brushes with death in their dealings with unruly mutinous Congolese, ranging from being placed before two different firing squads during one day and his evening as the selected victim of a hit contract given by the Union Miniere.

As for CIA employees who might testify well, should the Committee handle the Congo issue in executive session, Hedgeman recommended Edward Korn-Patterson, Bronson Tweedy, and Glen Fields.

FILE:

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