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what he knows to unauthorised persons, is difficult to assay. Should he in honest conviction reach the conclusion that he was misused and because USKAR considered him an obstacle to establishing full sway over AMIR-10, he could easily rationalise a betrayal. Other "ideological" considerations could be adduced by him to justify actively opposing USKAR. Whatever he may do along these lines would not be through inadvertence but by design. We have weighed and discarded the possibility of neutralising him through recruitment. This would not work if our reading of his personality is correct. We can think of a number of deterrents, out of USKAR's reach, which will probably make him think twice before throwing down the gauntlet. To provoke the enmity of both AMIR-10 and USKAR would be an act of defiance of which we consider AMIR-19 incapable. Besides, AMIR-19 strikes us as an individual imbued with a sense of basic decency and of Christian morality.

6. In balance we doubt whether AMIR-19 is going to pose a major threat to the security of AMIR-10. In any case, HQ's decision to accede to AMIR-10's desires on voting level liaison, even if it entails a rupture in relations with AMIR-19, was made in full awareness of the fact that he could cause trouble to a rudder degree if this be his intent. Should this come to pass, however, it would be unfair to shift the entire blame to AMIR-10. This would be hardly applying the glaring facts of political realism. AMIR-10 has displayed in the past a wider, and he will continue in displaying the same, his role vis-a-vis AMIR-19 is entirely honourable, and while HQ's, as an observer, may, with carnal, submit severe and questionable political validity, the fact remains that the final decision was USKAR's as much as it was AMIR-10's.

Henry D. Hecksher
11/11/60/EM

cc: COS, STANE

File:
AMIR-1 801/
AMIR-10 801
Policy

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