SECRET

-2-

refuses to comprehend or does not realize the huge
potential of this relationship. To prove
impervious to low-key advice that scandal could ensue
and that the full exploitation by Castro would be
foregone conclusion.

4. Above inventory of major defects in AMROD probably
incomplete and partly based on hearsay and derived from
partly prejudiced sources. Some manifestations of disarray
may merely be concomitant of organizational shakiness and
an overall lack of management. Others may be more serious
and entail loss of moral perspective. Our intent is to preclude
open Cuban propensity to fractionalism. In final analysis
we could probably justify the Agency input as long as AMROD-1
remains professional Bloc. Reconstruction of viable rests
solely on success inside Cuba; however, is remote prospect,
especially if to conclude that targets are not virtually
suited to all the immediate, short-term operations. Once
field op continues to prosper as long as we are permitted to
render intel support on its present level.

Henry D. Hecksher
W/BA/DO/HH

cc: DC/WH/BA

MDP/bh

Distribution:
Orig - Addressees
1 - W/BA/Exec (blind)
1 - W/BA/DO/HH - Policy File
SECRET

Form 4-1221 Approved
For Release 2001/03/04
CIA-RDP80-01601A000100150001-4