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1962, but the party had significant strength in three important south-central states (Paraná, São Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other Brazilian parties, it was abolished during a political reorganization under the Castello Branco administration. Most of the members then affiliated with the progovernment ARENA party and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant expansion in the number of political parties—the new Brazilian constitution sets down stringent standards that virtually eliminate the possibility of a repetition of the former proliferation of parties. The former PDC has had no attempt to reconstruct itself, but its former members will probably join with like-minded congressmen to pursue policies consistent with Christian Democratic ideology.

The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Catholic sources in Germany and Belgium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current head of the party, Rene de Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or popular appeal. With more vigorous leadership and the development of a middle-echelon cadre, the party might develop significant strength. As it is, the administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it.

The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties—in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay—show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale).

Party Youth Wings

As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants come from student organizations in local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, the voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point. In Panama, the party polled 11 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24.4 percent in January 1967. The Dominican PDC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962—its biggest strength would be in areas where student activity is strong. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966.

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Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67