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those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so from time to time there were those more or less informal contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secretary and they needed something from the State Department.

Senator Hart. I don't want to interrupt the flow of questions by the Staff on this sequence, but we may want to get some questions on your experience during the US situation on the Doctrine of "Plausible Deniability".

Mr. Dillon. That is something I feel I have a good deal to say about.

Senator Hart. You can proceed here sequentially.

Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your affidavit. And that is, you were indicating that when you joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for advice on your State Department experience.

Mr. Dillon. Until the time of the missile crisis, when they got together a new, what we called an EXCOM, Executive Committee. At that time, whether it was the result of the Bay of Pigs thing, or just the fact that the President knew me better, and we had been working together for a longer time, he called me in right at the beginning, and I had a very active role in this period.

Mr. Baron. But at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo

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