TOP SECRET

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The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a view that action which the Committee believes called for top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action of the junior officers. But it necessarily establishes that there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude within the CIA toward consultation which was unduly lax. Further, this case demonstrated the problems inherent in giving an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert operations without specifying which actions are and are not permissible, and without adequately supervising and monitoring these activities once begun.

(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration.

While we cannot find that high Administration officials expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived

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